Rights & Wrongs
Human Rights Television
Program #407
"SAFE HAVENS"
Charlayne Hunter-Gault
Running Time 26:42
June 6 1996

V.O. ANNOUNCER: Principal funding for "Rights & Wrongs" has been provided by the John D. And Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, and the Open Society Institute.

CHARLAYNE HUNTER-GAULT: Hello. I'm Charlayne Hunter-Gault, and you're watching "Rights and Wrongs." Our focus this week: how a secret United Nations deal led to the slaughter of thousands of Bosnians. Investigators from the international war crimes tribunal examine mass graves around Srebrenica, Bosnia.

MAN 1 SPEAKING (translated): As I was walking, I was stepping on bodies. At first I thought they were alive and they were trying to hide. I tried to pick someone up to see if I recognized them, if I knew anyone, and then I realized that all their limbs were separate.

CHARLAYNE HUNTER-GAULT: About 3,000 Muslims are thought to be buried near Srebrenica. 7,000 more are missing and presumed murdered, the worst case of genocide in Europe since World War II. How did this war crime happen? Who is responsible? Were officials of the United Nations accomplices?

V.O. ANNOUNCER: Globalvision presents "Rights & Wrongs: Human rights television."

CHARLAYNE HUNTER-GAULT: In every war, certain events stand out as defining moments. In the former Yugoslavia, one such turning point occurred in the summer of 1995 in a town called Srebrenica. Srebrenica was an enclave loyal to the embattled Bosnian government in Sarajevo, but surrounded by hostile Serbian forces. Its security had been guaranteed by the world community. The United Nations proclaimed Srebrenica a safe haven, and put the full force of its prestige and honor behind the protection of its citizens. In this two-part special report, we present the results of an international investigation into what happened at Srebrenica and why. Led by "Rights and Wrongs" contributor Ilan Ziv and conducted jointly with Reuters television, Newsday, and the British television program, "Dispatchers," the investigation was based on intercepted Bosnian Serb communications and internal United Nations correspondence. It reveals that high UN. Officials played central roles in a secret deal that contributed to the death of thousands. Our story begins in the Spring of 1993 inside the declared safe haven of Srebrenica.

WOMAN SPEAKING (V.O.): Srebrenica died a slow death. By the spring of 1993, the town was totally encircled by the Bosnian Serb army. They'd captured most of the nearby villages; now they were tightening their stranglehold on Srebrenica itself. For almost a year, the town was under siege. The Bosnian Serbs had swept across vast areas of Bosnia. In the east, only three pockets remained under Muslim government control, and a tidal wave of refugees headed for those last few places of safety. Srebrenica's normal population was 8,000. The flood of refugees meant up to 60,000 people were crammed into the town, and starving. The international community sent truckloads of food, but the Bosnian Serbs refused to let the convoys through. Furious at the Serbs' bloody mindedness, the U.N.'s military commander in Bosnia embarked on a personal crusade.

GENERAL PHILLIPE MORILLON: I myself have the intention to go in Srebrenica in order to see what we can do there.

WOMAN SPEAKING (V.O.): Driving at night, Morial's small convoy, soldiers, and aid workers managed to dodge the Serb lines and reach the besieged town.

GENERAL PHILLIPE MORILLON: (translated): All along the road into town, there were dozens-- hundreds of women, children, old people-- sitting in the snow, burning wooden boxes, trying to find a bit of warmth. It was silent. There was an atmosphere of death, despair. They were desperate at that moment.

WOMAN SPEAKING (V.O.): The town knew he was their only hope. When he tried to leave, women and children blocked his path. The General climbed onto his vehicle and made the people of Srebrenica a solemn promise: TV pictures that went 'round the world, words that should now haunt the world. Diplomats safely ensconced at the UN. In New York aren't used to such decisive statements. But Morial's very public position embarrassed them into action.

DIPLOMAT: ...Please raise their hands.

WOMAN SPEAKING (V.O.): The Security Council declared Srebrenica and five other enclaves to be safe areas. They would send in peacekeeping troops to ensure the Serb's respected that. For two years, people in Srebrenica trusted the U.N.'s promise, but the Bosnian Serbs used the lull to plan a huge military offensive. Last Spring, illegal supplies were coming into Bosnia from Serbia faster than ever. These soldiers are with the Bosnian government army. They're scouts from the 28th Division, which was defending Srebrenica. Their intelligence officer logged repeated violations of the arms embargo as the military buildup intensified.

MAJOR SEMSULIN MUMINOVIC (translated): The transportation of crude oil and armored vehicles was done using the bridges in Srenskaraca, Pablo Vicamost, near Diurna, the bridge near Karakaj, and the ones in Zvornik.

WOMAN SPEAKING (V.O.): He said the Serbs put up temporary pontoon bridges at night across the border, the river Garena, to evade the UN. Patrols who were supposed to monitor the arms embargo. What worried these scouts most was the arrival of a brigade of Serbian paramilitaries, led by the notorious commander "Arkan."

MITHAD SALIHOVIC: (translated): On June 21, from the direction of Belgrade, via Shabatz, Losnitz, and Ljubvja, a paramilitary force run by Zeljko Raznjatovic, nicknamed, "Arkan," crossed into the territory. About 4,000 of them assembled in Bratunac, and they were then sent to different areas around the enclave.

WOMAN SPEAKING (V.O.): The secret documents "dispatchers" uncovered confirmed the United Nations knew this, too. Arkan's brigade are accused of murder and rape wherever they go. The UN. Military observers who filed daily briefings on the safe areas realized the chilling significance.

MAN 2 SPEAKING (V.O.): Any attempt to clear an enclave would probably be manpower-intensive, and require commitment as well as other less salubrious qualities. The Bosnian Serb army soldiers are not showing these qualities, so a unit like the "Arkan" brigade would be necessary.

WOMAN SPEAKING (V.O.): The Bosnian 28th division also spotted troops from two brigades of the Yugoslav national army, the J.N.A.. That's based in what's still called Yugoslavia, but is now little more than the Republic of Serbia.

MAN 3 SPEAKING (V.O.): The J.N.A.. Planned the trip...

WOMAN SPEAKING (V.O.): Their link with the Bosnian Serb army was confirmed to "dispatchers" by a highly-placed NATO officer with the UN. In Bosnia who must remain anonymous.

MAN 3 SPEAKING (V.O.): The Bosnian Serb army couldn't plan an attack like this without the J.N.A.., Much less survive without them. The B.S.A.. Was not only supported by the J.N.A.. Logistically, but you have to look at their command and control and communications. The Bosnian Serb army communications were all networked with the J.N.A.. They were linked to Belgrade just like the Sam-six missile aimed at our planes.

WOMAN SPEAKING (V.O.): So how high did cooperation go between Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs? The answer may come from more intercepted phone calls between Bosnian Serb offices talking after the fall of Srebrenica. General Parajic is the J.N.A.'s chief of staff, and according to our secret military source, a man who played a key role in planning the attack of Srebrenica, along with the indicted Bosnian Serb General, Mladic.

MAN 3 SPEAKING (V.O.): Mladic was spotted with Parajic many times by attaches with the US., And from other NATO countries. During the last few weeks before the attack on Srebrenica, there was obviously a lot of planning and coordination between the two.

WOMAN SPEAKING (V.O.): So how much did the men in charge at the UN. Know of the military buildup? Yasushi Akashi was the U.N.'s special envoy to Yugoslavia.

YASUSHI AKASHI: The information at our disposal was very limited. We did not have access to previous intelligence reports about the movements of Bosnian Serb troops, or movements of Bosnian government troops.

WOMAN SPEAKING (V.O.): But even if the governments of Britain, France, or America were unwilling to share intelligence, the U.N.'s own people were constantly reporting the warning signs to the headquarters in Zagreb.

MAN 3 SPEAKING (V.O.): We passed all this information to Zagreb in May and June. God knows what happened to it. There was a major disconnect between Zagreb and Sarajevo. They had a political agenda, and we had a military one.

WOMAN SPEAKING (V.O.): Information also came from the Bosnian government.

HASAN MURATOVIC: We warned United Nations officials many times that troops of Serbia, they're coming, that troops also are already there at the border across the river. And so we knew it was going to be attacked.

INTERVIEWER (V.O.): Did they give you these warnings, and if so, what did you do about it?

YASUSHI AKASHI: Of course, they gave us all kinds of warnings in all kinds of situations. Some were in the nature of false alarms. Others turned out to be true, perhaps not always on exactly the same scale as they had warned us.

WOMAN SPEAKING (V.O.): But "Dispatchers" has seen the confidential correspondence covering the crucial two months before the attack on Srebrenica. There's not one report from Yasushi Akashi relaying those warnings on to the UN. Indeed, when the town fell, headquarters were clearly angry.

MAN 4 SPEAKING (V.O.); How is it that UNPROFOR was taken unawares again by the true extent of Serbian intentions? I find it difficult to accept that no early warning was possible.

V.O. ANNOUNCER: You are watching "Rights and Wrongs: Human rights television."

CHARLAYNE HUNTER-GAULT: The lives of the people of Srebrenica depended on NATO air strikes, which the UN. could call in as a powerful backup to its 450 lightly armed peacekeepers. Yet the man in charge of the UN. Protection force in Yugoslavia made a deal with the Bosnian Serbs not to employ NATO's f-16 jets. As we shall see, the deal sealed the fate of Srebrenica and its inhabitants.

WOMAN SPEAKING (V.O.): The defense of the Srebrenica safe area depended on about 450 Dutch soldiers. The UN. Military commanders wanted a much bigger force, but most governments, including Britain, were unwilling to risk any more of their troops. Bosnian government troops handed over their heavy weapons to the Dutch peacekeepers. The Bosnian Serbs refused. The Dutch themselves were only lightly armed. On their own, they could never stop a full-scale Serb attack.

YASUSHI AKASHI: We were given an impossible mandate. We were given very insufficient resources to do the job. Our forces were very limited, as you know. We had only 450 Dutch troops. They were very courageous, efficient soldiers, but they were terribly outnumbered.

WOMAN SPEAKING (V.O.): The UN. Could always call in NATO planes as powerful backup to the small force on the ground. F-16 fighters were based a short flight away in northern Italy, and it's clear from another secret document "Dispatchers" has seen that NATO considered air strikes the only thing that would deter the Bosnian Serbs.

MAN 5 SPEAKING (V.O.): For more effective support of UN. operations, coalition forces must be able and willing to escalate the level of force when previous UN. sanctions do not produce the desired results.

WOMAN SPEAKING (V.O.): That was certainly the view of the British General, Rupert Smith. He was the U.N.'s Commander in Bosnia, and he believed the only way to make the Serbs listen was to hit them hard. In May last year, he told them to remove heavy weapons from around Sarajevo.

GENERAL RUPERT SMITH: Failure to comply with either deadline will result in the offending party, or parties, being attacked from the air.

WOMAN SPEAKING (V.O.): But at UN. Headquarters in New York, his French boss, General Benoit Jeanvier, the man in overall charge of UNPROFOR, the UN. protection force in Yugoslavia, felt very differently. He expressed those views at a meeting of countries supplying peacekeeping troops.

MAN 6 SPEAKING (V.O.): We have neither the means, the structure, or the specific training in combat at our disposal. We have little time ahead of us. We have to limit the risk to our troops.

WOMAN SPEAKING (V.O.): The UN. member governments should give him the resources to do the job properly, or pull the peacekeepers out of the safe area.

MAN 6 SPEAKING (V.O.): No more can we play at war.

WOMAN SPEAKING (V.O.): America's Ambassador to the UN., Madeleine Albright, didn't hide her frustration at Jeanvier's position.

MADELEINE ALBRIGHT: What I think, again, came out of this, and some questions that I myself asked, have to do with the question that we don't understand why air power is not appropriate at this time.

WOMAN SPEAKING (V.O.): Neither did General Rupert smith, and the following day, he ordered another round of air attacks. The Bosnian Serbs responded by taking hostage 350 UN. Soldiers, mainly French, and paraded them as human shields against further air attacks. General Smith's strongarm tactics had backfired in a most humiliating way, and one which would dramatically alter how the UN. would act from now on.

YASUSHI AKASHI: For us, liberating our hostages was our highest priority. When you are the official most responsible for safety and the security of all your personnel, of course, getting freedom for all those who are detained, or who are in the hostage status, had highest priority for me.

WOMAN SPEAKING (V.O.): Amongst the secret documents, a letter which proves how this new priority affected UN. policy. General Jeanvier wrote to General Smith asking him to comply with a request to consult the UN. Secretary General before he authorized any more air attacks. It's diplomatic jargon for saying, "in future, we'll give the orders, not you." General Jeanvier now began a series of secret meetings to resolve the hostage crisis his way.

GENERAL CEES NICOLAI (translated): Smith was really straightforward. He said, "I won't talk to the Serbs until they release all the hostages unconditionally." Jeanvier, because of national pressure, since a lot of the hostages were French, was ready and willing to negotiate about the release of the hostages.

WOMAN SPEAKING (V.O.): At a hotel in Zvornik, in Serbia, General Jeanvier met the Bosnian Serb General Mladic, and the Yugoslav army's Chief of Staff, General Parajic, confirming his key role in everything that happened.

INTERVIEWER: Were you aware that he was going to Maliszvornik for this meeting? Did you authorize it in advance?

YASUSHI AKASHI: Yes.

WOMAN SPEAKING (V.O.): "Dispatchers" has seen General Jeanvier's confidential report of the five-hour meeting. He admitted to the Bosnian Serbs they had the upper hand.

MAN 7 SPEAKING (V.O.): The air strikes opened the window just a crack, and you can profit from this crisis. Don't neglect this chance to regain your credibility in the international community.

WOMAN SPEAKING (V.O.): General Mladic needed no prompting. His terms were never in doubt.

MAN 8 SPEAKING (V.O.): The hostages will be released immediately in exchange for a promise of no more air strikes against the Serbs.

MAN 9 SPEAKING (V.O.): A senior French military source confirmed General Jeanvier had no option, and no backing. Without a formal agreement being made, both sides left the table understanding the position.

YASUSHI AKASHI: I'm not aware of any such deal, and I had utmost confidence in General Jeanvier, his mental judgment, as well as his personal integrity.

WOMAN SPEAKING (V.O.): All that remained now was to convince other senior UN. figures. Five days later, they all flew into the Croatian port of split. Their arrivals were public, their agenda was not.

YASUSHI AKASHI: I have nothing to say at this time, maybe after the meeting.

INTERVIEWER: Can you tell us why you're here this morning?

FRED ECKHARD: It's a routine strategy session between Mr.. Akashi and General Smith and General Jeanvier, the force commander.

WOMAN SPEAKING (V.O.): It was anything but routine. It was to confirm the position over air strikes, and bring General smith into line with this controversial change in policy. The meeting was held at a military base a few miles outside split, and was secret. What emerges most clearly is the deep division between General Smith and Jeanvier.

MAN 10 SPEAKING (V.O.): We are not able to use air power, because we have soldiers on the ground.

MAN 11 SPEAKING (V.O.): Our analysis of the Serbs' intentions is to finish the war this year. They will destroy the eastern enclaves this year.

WOMAN SPEAKING (V.O.): But the French General stuck to his view: the Serbs wouldn't attack.

MAN 10 SPEAKING (V.O.): The Serbs need international recognition. I don't think they want to go to the extreme.

WOMAN SPEAKING (V.O.): According to the confidential minutes, General Smith became exasperated. In fact, the atmosphere was so tense, they adjourned to one of Jeanvier's favorite seafood restaurants. The waitress remembers General Jeanvier chose the wine, Akashi ordered oysters. But nothing on the menu could sweeten the bitter disagreement that had gone before.

MAN 11 SPEAKING (V.O.): This is a waste of time. The UN. Should prepare ground rules and declare we are prepared to fight.

MAN 10 SPEAKING (V.O.): I insist we will never use force and impose our will on the Serbs.

WOMAN SPEAKING (V.O.): Finally, Akashi intervened.

MAN 12 SPEAKING (V.O.): We have to defer to Jeanvier as the superior Commander.

WOMAN SPEAKING (V.O.): The meeting that ended over the lunch table was enormously significant, and kept totally secret.

YASUSHI AKASHI: There was no reason why we should publicize or publicly inform of such meetings, or the contents of the meeting.

WOMAN SPEAKING (V.O.): By the end of that day, an agreement had been reached which was designed to win the freedom of all the UN. soldiers held hostage. But it also sealed the fate of Srebrenica.

V.O. ANNOUNCER: "Rights and Wrongs" is now on-line. Please be in touch with us by E-mail and visit our internet site on the World Wide Web.

CHARLAYNE HUNTER-GAULT(V.O.): In our next edition of "Rights and Wrongs," the final act of the tragedy of Srebrenica.

MAN 13 SPEAKING (V.O.): If this continues, a massacre is possible. The relationship with the local population is deteriorating, and the UN. Is losing credibility in Bosnia.

MAN 14 SPEAKING (translated): I was in front of the post office when the Commander came and said they were going to protect us. I was not alone. There were thousands of us. It was night. Around midnight, we asked what was going to happen, and they promised to protect us.

MITHAD SALIHOVIC (translated): We believed in the international community that if there was a serious threat of the genocide that then happened, they would intervene.

MAN 15 SPEAKING (V.O.): Tears were in our eyes seeing desperate, displaced persons with no secure future looking at us, seeking help we cannot give them. We really lost this enclave in our heads.

MAN 16 SPEAKING (translated): We never had any doubts about what will happen after the men and women were separated. Only a fool would not have expected it, or someone who's extremely badly informed. I don't know whether the force commander was a fool, or badly informed, but he shares the responsibility for the genocide.

CHARLAYNE HUNTER-GAULT: Do United Nations officials share responsibility for genocide? The answer to this question is important not only to set the record straight about the past, but also because the world is now writing the post-cold war rules of future wars and peace. Next week, the conclusion of our investigative special, "Safe Haven." We welcome your viewer responses and suggestions. Please write us, or you can reach us via E-mail. I'm Charlayne Hunter-Gault. Thank you for watching "Rights and Wrongs."

V.O. ANNOUNCER: Principal funding for "Rights & Wrongs" has been provided by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur foundation, Open Society Institute, and the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. "Rights & Wrongs" welcomes your written comments and suggestions. You can also order a transcript for $5, or a videocassette for $24.95, by writing to: the Global Center, P.O. Box 311, Radio City Station, New York, New York, 10101. Send checks or money orders only. Credit card holders, call 1-800-541-2535.