Rights & Wrongs
Human Rights Television
Program #408
"SAFE HAVENS" pt. 2
Charlayne Hunter-Gault
Running Time 26:46
June 13, 1996

V.O. ANNOUNCER: Principal funding for "Rights & Wrongs" has been provided by the John D. And Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, and the Open Society Institute.

CHARLAYNE HUNTER-GAULT: Hello, I'm Charlayne Hunter-Gault, and you're watching "Rights & Wrongs." Our focus this week: why thousands died while under United Nations protection.

(guns firing)

V.O. MAN SPEAKING: If this continues, a massacre is possible. The relationship with the local population is deteriorating, and the U.N. is losing credibility in Bosnia.

BOSNIAN MAN (translated): We believed in international community-- that if there was a serious threat of the genocide that then happened, they would intervene.

JOSE-MARIA MENDILUCE(translated): I don't know whether the post commander was a fool or badly informed, but he shares the responsibility for the genocide.

V.O. ANNOUNCER: Globalvision presents "Rights & Wrongs": human rights television.

CHARLAYNE HUNTER-GAULT: In the previous edition of "Rights & Wrongs," we presented the first of a two-part special examining the July 1995 massacre of thousands of Muslims in the Bosnian town of Srebrenica. The program was based on an international investigation led by "Rights & Wrongs" contributor Ilan Ziv, and conducted jointly with Reuters television, Newsday, and the British television program "Dispatches." Based on intercepted Bosnian Serb communications and internal United Nations correspondence, the investigation revealed that high U.N.. Officials played key roles in a secret deal that led to the worst case of genocide in Europe since World War II. In this program, the final act in the tragedy of Srebrenica and the conclusion of our investigative special, "safe haven," but first, here's a recap of the story thus far.

V.O. WOMAN: Srebrenica died a slow death. By the spring of '93, the town was totally encircled by the Bosnian Serb army. Furious at the Serbs' bloody- mindedness, the U.N.'s military commander in Bosnia embarked on a personal crusade. The general climbed onto his vehicle and made the people of Srebrenica a solemn promise. For two years, people in Srebrenica trusted the U.N.'s promise, but the Bosnian Serbs used the lull to plan a huge military offensive.

HUSAN MURATOVIC, BOSNIAN P.M.: We warned United Nations officials many times that troops from Serbia, they're coming, that troops are also already there at the border across the river, and so, and so, we... We knew it was going to be attacked.

INTERVIEWER: Did they give you these warnings, and if so, what did they do about them?

YASUSHI AKASHI, FORMER U.N. SPECIAL ENVOY: They gave us all kinds of warnings in all kinds of situations.

V.O. WOMAN: British general Rupert Smith, the U.N.'s commander in Bosnia. He believed the only way to make the Serbs listen was to hit them hard.

GENERAL RUPERT SMITH: Failure to comply with either deadline will result in the offending party or parties being attacked from the air.

(siren)

V.O. WOMAN :The Bosnian Serbs responded by taking hostage 350 U.N.. Soldiers, and paraded them as human shields against further air attacks.

YASUSHI AKASHI: For us, liberating our hostages was our highest priority.

V.O. WOMAN: General Janvier, the man in overall charge of UNPROFOR, the U.N.. Protection force in Yugoslavia, now began a series of secret meetings to resolve the hostage crisis his way.

REPORTER: Can you tell us why you're here this morning?

FRED ECKHARD, U.N. SPOKESMAN: It's a routine strategy session between Mr. Akashi and general smith and general Janvier, the force commander.

V.O. WOMAN: It was anything but routine. It was to confirm the position over air strikes and bring general Smith into line with this controversial change in policy. By the end of that day, an agreement had been reached which was designed to win the freedom of all the U.N.. Soldiers held hostage, but it also sealed the fate of Srebrenica.

CHARLAYNE HUNTER-GAULT: As we shall see, top United Nations military aides predicted the Serb attack on Srebrenica months before it occurred, and advised that the only defense was NATO air power. But French general Bernard Janvier, the supreme U.N. Military commander in the former Yugoslavia, decided to halt NATO air attacks in exchange for the release of U.N. peace keepers held hostage by the Bosnian Serbs. Here now, the conclusion of "safe haven."

(rockets being fired)

V.O. WOMAN: The final act was beginning in the tragedy of Srebrenica. On July 6 last year, the Bosnian Serbs began their long-planned offensive. The Bosnian Muslim commander begged to the U.N.. For air attacks to stop the Serb guns pounding the town.

Among the secret United Nations documents uncovered by "dispatches," a remarkably similar plea from their own military observers, under attack with the rest of the town's people.

V.O. MAN : If this continues, a massacre is possible. The relationship with the local population is deteriorating, and the U.N. is losing credibility in Bosnia.

RAMIZ BECIREVIC, BOSNIAN ARMY COMMANDER(translated): We believed in international community, that if there was a serious threat of the genocide that then happened, they would intervene, because they took on the responsibility handed to them by the security council to protect the area.

V.O. WOMAN: There was a detailed procedure, "blue sword," to launch an air attack to support U.N. troops under threat.The Dutch commander, lieutenant colonel Carramands, stranded in Srebrenica, had already put in three requests; this one, the night of the ninth. Three times he was told no.

GENERAL CEES NICOLAI, CHIEF OF STAFF TO GENERAL SMITH (translated): As far as lieutenant colonel Carramands' request for close air support goes, Zagreb reacted like this: "Before we use the ultimate weapon, we should react first with a lower level of force."

V.O. WOMAN: But at U.N.. Headquarters in Zagreb, by the fifth night of the Serb attack, they'd changed their minds. All of Janvier's aides now agreed it was time to call in NATO air power. Planes were ordered to take off at dawn to be ready if the situation flared up again, and the Bosnian Serbs were given an ultimatum: "Stop shelling by 6:00 A.M. or be attacked."

That news was passed to the commander of the Dutch battalion in Srebrenica. In the early hours of the morning, he relayed it to the town's leaders, even telling them where the targets would be.

OSMAN SULJIC, SREBRENICA TOWN COUNCIL (translated): The area he had marked on the map. He called it a death zone. I personally asked Carramands, as a human being and not as a commander, if he can promise that the attack will come. He told me he promised me as a commander and as a human being.

INTERVIEWER: Did you believe Carramands was telling the truth?

RAMIZ BECIREVIC(translated): Yes, at that moment we believed him, because he spelled out the entire plan for the attack, and spelled out and emphasized the political agreement of the governments involved.

V.O. WOMAN: Carramands also advised commander Ramies to move everyone out of the area, which he did. Ramies then went outside to reassure the refugees.

ASKIM HASKIC, SREBRENICA SURVIVOR(translated): I was in front of the post office when the commander came and said they were going to protect us. I was not alone. There were thousands of us. This was night. Around midnight we asked what was going to happen, and they promised to protect us.

V.O. WOMAN: The secret operational log sheet confirms fighter planes were in the air and ready to hit targets from 6:50 A.M. onwards. F-16's circled for hours without general Janvier issuing the order to strike. They landed again mid-morning when their fuel ran out.

In Srebrenica, soldiers and civilians waited, watching the empty sky.

On July 11, the day the expected air attacks never came, the U.N.. Safe area of Srebrenica finally fell to the Bosnian Serbs. The tanks that rolled in found a deserted town. Thousands of refugees had already fled to a U.N. base, surely the one place they'd still be safe. The U.N.. military observers who watched are no longer dispassionate in their reporting.

V.O. MAN: "Tears were in our eyes seeing the desperate, displaced persons with no secure future looking at us, seeking help we cannot give them. We've really lost this enclave and our heads."

V.O. WOMAN: Even now, general Mladic was dictating terms: the Serbs would provide the buses to move the refugees, and not the U.N.. And once again, the U.N. gave in.

HASAN MURATOVIC: We knew if they were going to be taken by buses, they would kill them. We know what Serbs did before. Whenever they captured people, they either detained or killed all males from 18 to 55. It has never happened that the men of that age arrived across the front line.

V.O. WOMAN: His fears were clearly spelled out at a meeting with U.N.. Staff, who reported his words on to Yasushi Akashi.

V.O. MAN:"It would be a disaster. The U.N. should protect them in the area where they are. It's supposed to be a protected area."

V.O. WOMAN: His worst fears of what would happen were confirmed by this video. A Serb cameraman unwittingly filmed the men being separated from the women and children.

JOSE-MARIA MENDILUCE, FORMER U.N. SPECIAL ENVOY (translated): We never had any doubts about what will happen after the men and women were separated, in particular in Srebrenica, where the cruelty was going to be worse because Mladic wanted to avenge the Bosnian offensive of 1992. Only a fool would not have expected it, or someone who's extremely badly informed. I don't know whether the force commander was a fool or badly informed, but he shares the responsibility for the genocide.

V.O. WOMAN: Deserted by the U.N., a column of exhausted soldiers and civilians made one last attempt to escape in the hours before Srebrenica fell.

(guns firing)

They walked straight into an ambush.

"Dispatches" has seen an intercepted signal from the Bosnian Serbs. They called for a bulldozer with a shovel so that those who surrendered could be killed and buried.

For miles around, it became one huge killing field.

V.O. MAN: We hear some shooting from the area of Bratunac. Because the men were taken in separate buses, we fear for the worst.

V.O. WOMAN: But Yasushi Akashi in his daily report leaves any mention until page two, paragraph eight.

V.O. YASUSHI AKASHI:"We are beginning to detect a shortfall in the number of people expected to arrive in Tuzla."

(guns firing)

V.O. WOMAN: UN headquarters sent him a sharp note:"What about the reports of mass murder coming from refugees?"

V.O. MAN: They're widespread and consistent and have been given credence by a variety of international observers. We have, however, received nothing on the subject from UNPROFOR."

V.O. WOMAN: So did the U.N.'s special envoy underreport the dangers?

YASUSHI AKASHI: I cannot say whether we did so or not, but as I said, in hindsight, it might have been so.

V.O. WOMAN: 3,000 Muslims are dead; up to 7,000 more are still missing. Those who anxiously scan the boards know there's very little chance they'll ever see husbands and fathers again. General Janvier refused to speak to "dispatches," despite repeated requests. Yasushi Akashi was promoted. He certainly never considered resigning.

YASUSHI AKASHI: No, I... I felt that it was my duty to do my best, you know, in carrying out my job under the difficult circumstances. So long as I had the confidence of the U.N. Secretary-general, I felt that I should continue. Abdication of my responsibility would have been an act of irresponsibility.

V.O. WOMAN: Srebrenica is now under Serb control. The united nations failed in its promise to protect the town, but the U.N.. Is only the voice of its member states, and all the evidence is that Western governments lacked the political will. They were prepared to sacrifice Srebrenica and its people.

V.O. MAN: "It took a total of 72 hours for the Bosnian Serbs to uproot, round up, arrest, expel, and possibly kill the entire Bosnian population of Srebrenica."

V.O. WOMAN: A week after the town fell, an American major with the U.N.. filed his report. He was brutally succinct:

V.O. MAN: "A deliberate and planned execution of an ethnic cleansing operation which UNPROFOR and the community of nations have watched with little or no response."

V.O. ANNOUNCER: You are watching "Rights & Wrongs:" Human Rights Television.

CHARLAYNE HUNTER-GAULT: The massacre in Srebrenica raises key human rights questions: first and foremost, what role, if any, should morality play in the formulation and execution of international policy? I discussed these issues recently with Robert Gallucci, dean of the Georgetown University school of foreign service, and until recently, the top US State department official in the Balkan peace process. Also joining us, Pulitzer prize-winning journalist Roy Gutman of "Newsday," one of the key figures in the safe haven investigation. Bob Gallucci, let me start with you. Does morality ever enter into the equation in these situations?

BOB GALLUCCI: In my 21 years of government experience, I'd say morality always enters into the calculation, but it is not always-- I don't want to say rarely-- but it certainly is not always prescriptive. It does not dispose of the issue. There's long-term; there's short-term. There's a calculation about what will work and what risks are reasonable to take. All these infect the moral judgment and make it a very difficult one often to make.

ROY GUTMAN: You know, we risked hundreds of lives, and certainly dozens, to rescue one pilot who was shot down in Bosnian Serb-held territory. Now we hear from the leaders of NATO on the ground that it is not worth risking the life of one American boy to capture Karadzic or Mladic. I mean, they're making a moral calculation-- in fact a political calculation that seems to me the president of the United States himself has to make-- and it has to be made, and we have to hold the politicians accountable for that.

BOB GALLUCCI: Indeed. I mean, I'm certainly all in favor of holding those we elect, and make those kinds of decisions accountable. My only observation here is that it is not a simple choice.

CHARLAYNE HUNTER-GAULT: But let's look at Dayton, where the... President Slobodan Milosevic was very much involved in bringing together all of the forces on the Serb side to the peace table. Roy Gutman, let me ask you about Milosevic and what your reporting showed about his complicity with Mladic and Karadzic. I mean, did it show that a deal was made with Milosevic, or what?

ROY GUTMAN: I think there's been a trend and a pattern of the U.S. Government, which is that we know pretty well that Milosevic has played this role, the godfather's role and the supporting role throughout the war in Bosnia, but we have been reluctant to blame him, because it would mean we can't really sit down and write a deal with him. Don't forget, a month or two before Dayton, the Croats and the Bosnian army were on an offensive and practically took all of northern Bosnia. They were stopped by the United States in order to have the Dayton conference. So yes, to have this particular outcome of a 50-50 division of Bosnia, I suppose you had to have Milosevic on board. That was a political judgment by the administration. So in that sense, yes, they did make a deal to look the other way for everything Milosevic had done.

CHARLAYNE HUNTER-GAULT: Do you accept that? That you made a deal to look the other way?

BOB GALLUCCI: I know of no explicit deal that relieves Milosevic of any responsibility for anything he may have done through the course of that war, or for the war happening in the first place. If the war crimes tribunal were tomorrow morning to indict Milosevic, I don't know that anybody would say there was a violation of any deal. I know of no agreement with anybody that he would not be indicted, and I have no reason to believe that at some point he might not be.

CHARLAYNE HUNTER-GAULT: Well, we can't resolve this one, but let's move on to our next area. Roy Gutman, in your reporting, what did you turn up about intelligence?

ROY GUTMAN: Well, Mladic, the Bosnian Serb general, told the U.N.. Officials in Sarajevo, like general Smith, that he really had to go for the enclaves, the eastern little islands of population like Srebrenica, because they were taking up too many soldiers and too many resources, and he said that he... he indicated that he had to do it in 1995. So there was a lot of expectation within the U.N. That this would happen. I think the US government had some indication, some specific indications as well, and that is where the intelligence, I guess, failure or lapse occurred, because the US side, up until the day Srebrenica fell, was unsure about the goals of the Bosnian Serbs and the Yugoslavs. The Bosnian army had certainly made up its mind. The U.N., Mr. Akashi and Mr.. ... And general Janvier, acted as if Srebrenica would last forever. So yes, intelligence really was lacking.

CHARLAYNE HUNTER-GAULT: Does that surprise you, Bob Gallucci?

BOB GALLUCCI: The collection of intelligence, getting it to the right people, having them understand what they're seeing, it's a reasonably complicated task in the government, and one doesn't have to have a conspiracy theory of any kind to explain why one does not immediately understand the full significance of things especially when, as was just noted, things are happening pretty quickly.

CHARLAYNE HUNTER-GAULT: Roy Gutman, you broke the story of the evidence of death camps in Bosnia in 1992, and you and others tried to bring this to the attention of the US. Government and its allies, and they ignored you.

ROY GUTMAN: Well, in 1992 the intelligence community was picking up a tremendous amount of information that indicated all sorts of atrocities were going on in Bosnia, and they said subsequently that there was no question about the essence of what was going on, but they didn't focus on concentration camps until my story appeared. I mean, that's understandable in a way. It's a new phenomenon. I'd like to think that, with all of their capabilities, they'd be ahead of any of us in the press, but maybe in fact we do tip them off to trends that they don't always see. I think that holds for 1992, and I can understand that to some degree then. I can't understand it in 1995. You know, it was nearly a month before the US. Government came to a realization and started making an international uproar about the massacres in Srebrenica. I don't see why they weren't doing the obvious, which is to follow up on a conquest just by tuning in to the radio transmitters, by asking the Bosnians, by just collecting everything they could so that we weren't taken by surprise once again.

CHARLAYNE HUNTER-GAULT: Are there lessons from...From this that can be... Can be drawn?

BOB GALLUCCI: The international community-- the united states, the Europeans, and others-- were looking at the difficult case of Bosnia and not seeing an easy way to intervene. The burden was put on the United Nations, which was utterly incapable of stabilizing that situation and preventing atrocities from happening.

ROY GUTMAN: Yeah, but the point is that a human rights atrocity is not just a violation of human rights. It has a tremendous political impact in the country and eventually outside of the country where it happens. And leaders such as our president or the western leaders in general should have the information in as real time as possible so that they can decide whether this is the time to intervene, or they can use it for other reasons. I'm not saying that we intervene simply because of an atrocity, but this does give, in fact, the occasion for political decisions, and I think those moments were missed again and again and again throughout this whole tragedy.

CHARLAYNE HUNTER-GAULT: Well, Bob Gallucci and Roy Gutman, thank you.

BOB GALLUCCI: Thank you.

CHARLAYNE HUNTER-GAULT: We welcome viewer responses and suggestions. Please write us, or you can reach us via e-mail. I'm Charlayne Hunter-Gault. Thank you for watching "Rights & Wrongs."

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